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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  18-1322 
________________ 
 
OSCAR CAZAREZ-ARGUELLO, 
 
       Petitioner  
 
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
       Respondent 
 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Steven A. Morley 
(No. A200-687-520) 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2019) 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Oscar Cazarez-Arguello came to the United States unlawfully from Mexico in 
1990 and has been here ever since.  He lives with his ex-wife and their adult U.S. citizen 
daughter, Linda.   
 In 2010, the Government began removal proceedings against Cazarez-Arguello.  
He conceded that he was removable and requested cancellation of removal on the ground 
that his departure would cause Linda to suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).  He is close with Linda, who suffers from 
depression and anxiety.  On this basis, an Immigration Judge cancelled his removal, but 
the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed.  On appeal to our Court, Cazarez-Arguello 
argues that the BIA abused its discretion in reversing the IJ’s decision.   
 We have no jurisdiction to hear this petition.  Except under circumstances not 
pertinent here, “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the 
granting of relief under [8 U.S.C. § 1229b].”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  The case 
before us presents a factual dispute about a predicate for relief under § 1229b: whether 
Linda will suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if her father is removed.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).  “We have squarely held that because ‘the decision 
whether an alien meets the hardship requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b is a discretionary 
judgment,’ we lack jurisdiction to review such a decision.”  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 
(3d Cir. 2003)); see also id. (no appellate jurisdiction over argument that “the BIA gave 
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short shrift to [the alien’s] evidence or failed to adequately account for the hardship [that 
a qualifying relative] would suffer in the event of removal”). 
 Even Cazarez-Arguello frames the question presented as a factual determination 
we may not reach: whether “his removal from the United States would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his twenty-one year old daughter, who . . . 
depends in large part upon her father for her sense of well being and security.”  Pet’r Br. 
at iii.  The IJ emphasized Linda’s “mental and emotional fragility” and the potential 
“financial dislocation” that would result from her father’s departure.  A.R. 64.  Cazarez-
Arguello and Linda have a “very close bond,” A.R. 60, and she had trouble sleeping 
when he was first detained, A.R. 64.  On the financial front, the IJ observed that without 
Cazarez-Arguello contributing his earnings to the household, Linda is unlikely to have 
the resources to obtain a GED and go to college.  A.R. 64–65. 
 By contrast, the BIA stressed that Linda is an employed adult, has a serious 
boyfriend, and is closer to her mother than her father.  See A.R. 60.  Evidence as to 
treatment of Linda’s depression is scant, consisting of a single letter from a therapist who 
last treated her in 2013.  See A.R. 4, 484.  And concerns about the financial and 
educational hardship wrought by Cazarez-Arguello’s removal are speculative; Linda is 
not currently working toward a GED and has no definite plans for college.  A.R. 4.  To be 
sure, the BIA acknowledged the “close and loving relationship” between father and 
daughter and the “adverse emotional impact” that Linda will suffer if Cazarez-Arguello is 
removed.  A.R. 4–5.  But it concluded that the situation did not meet the “exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship” standard, which requires hardship “substantially beyond the 
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ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this 
country.”  In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001) (quotations 
omitted). 
 In sum, this case presents just the sort of difficult factual dispute that we may not 
resolve.  Because “we may not rehash the BIA’s hardship calculation,” Pareja, 615 F.3d 
at 187, we must dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.  See also Patel v. Att’y Gen., 
619 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 2010).   
